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TORT CLAIM PREEMPTION UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT-COURTS STILL STRUGGLING
WITH THE MEANING OF "SERVICES"
BAINE T. SELLERS*
IN GILL V.]ETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP., the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts partially denied a motion for
judgment on the pleadings by JetBlue Airways Corporation (Jet-
Blue) in a personal injury case alleging negligence byJetBlue's
employees.' The court held that, although the employees' ac-
tions fell within the definition of "services" under the Aviation
Deregulation Act (ADA), the plaintiffs tort claim was not pre-
empted by the ADA because any connections between state neg-
ligence law and airline services were "too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral."2 While the court ultimately came to the correct
conclusion that the ADA did not preempt state law, the employ-
ees' actions should not be considered "services" because Con-
gress's intent was only to free the airline industry from state
economic regulation.'
In 2009, George Gill, a quadriplegic who uses a wheelchair,
was given permission to begin boarding early on a JetBlue flight
from Boston.4 Two JetBlue employees accompanied Gill down
the jetway to the aircraft.' Upon reaching the plane, Gill needed
to transfer to a narrower "aisle/boarding wheelchair."' The em-
ployees removed Gill's armrest and raised the armrest of the
boarding wheelchair so that he could slide from his wheelchair
* Baine Sellers is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2014, at Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law. He received his B.A. in Economics
from the University of Texas at Austin in 2009. Baine would like to thank his
family and friends for all of their support.
1 836 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35 (D. Mass. 2011).
2 Id. at 41, 43.
3 See Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998)
(en banc).
4 Gill, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 37.
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into the other.7 After Gill had transferred wheelchairs, the em-
ployees found that the armrest on the boarding wheelchair was
stuck in the "up" position and could not be lowered.' They left
the armrest up, over Gill's objection, and continued preparing
the wheelchair.' As the employees prepared the wheelchair, Gill
slid off the seat and fractured his left femur.'o Gill filed suit
against JetBlue in state court for personal injury, alleging negli-
gence and negligent supervision for failing to properly train the
employees." JetBlue removed the case to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts on the basis of federal diversity
jurisdiction and moved for judgment on the pleadings under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)."
While it did not determine the outcome of this case, the anal-
ysis of whether the employees' assistance to Gill should be con-
sidered a "service" under the ADA is nevertheless important
because it illuminates a sharp divide between circuit courts."
The ADA, which amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
included a preemption provision intended to improve competi-
tion and efficiency in the airline industry from an economic
standpoint by reducing state regulation of the industry." This
provision mandates that a state "may not enact or enforce a law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law
related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier."15 Therefore,
the court in Gill had to answer two questions: (1) whether assist-
ing a disabled person board a plane constituted a "service"
within the meaning of the ADA; and (2) whether state negli-
gence law, as applied to the personal injury in this case, suffi-
ciently "related to" that service."
Because neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit
Court of Appeals had settled the issue, the district court consid-
ered the conflicting decisions of other circuits to determine the







13 See id. at 39-41.
14 Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 367-68 (2008) (citing
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992)).
15 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2006) (emphasis added).




Inc., the Ninth Circuit used a narrow interpretation of the
term-which the Third Circuit later adopted"-concluding
that the term was used "in the public utility sense-i.e., the pro-
vision of air transportation to and from various markets at vari-
ous times"-and did not encompass "the dispensing of food and
drinks, flight attendant assistance, or the like.""0 However, the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits followed a much broader con-
struction espoused by Hodges v. Delta Air Lines, in which the Fifth
Circuit held that because "[s] ervices generally represent a bar-
gained-for or anticipated provision of labor from one party to
another," the term includes "items such as ticketing, boarding
procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling,
in addition to the transportation itself."20 While stopping short
of the Hodges rule, the Fourth and Second Circuits also avoided
a definition as narrow as that of Charras.2 1 After noting that dis-
trict courts within the First Circuit had generally used the Hodges
rule, the court in Gill opted to follow it as well.2 2
Finally, the court noted that other portions of the ADA re-
quire airlines to obtain insurance policies for injuries "'resulting
from the operation or maintenance of the aircraft.' "23 Because
these insurance policies would be unnecessary if Congress in-
tended to preempt all state law tort claims, the court found it
"necessary to exclude aircraft operation itself from the defini-
tion of 'service' covered by the preemption clause." 2 4 This dis-
tinction between "service" and "operation" also led the Fifth
Circuit in Hodges to conclude that "the ADA did not preempt
state-law personal-injury claims arising from hazardous condi-
18 Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir.
1998).
19 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
20 Hodges v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(quoting panel opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Branche v. Air-
tran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2003); Travel All Over the
World, Inc. v. Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 (7th Cir. 1996).
21 See Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[B]oarding
procedures are a service rendered by an airline."); Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v.
Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the provision of amenities
while a plane was on the ground was a "service" under the ADA).
22 Gill, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 40; see also DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81,
88 (1st Cir. 2011) (adopting a broad definition of "services").
23 Gill, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (2006)).
24 Id
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tions onboard aircraft and boarding facilities."2 ' Accordingly,
the court adopted the view that the term "services" "encom-
passes all bargained-for or anticipated elements of air travel pro-
vided by air carriers except for those related to aircraft
operation and maintenance.""
The district court, however, erred in adopting the overly ex-
pansive Hodges interpretation, highlighting an alarming trend
among the circuits. The issue in this case was fortunately ren-
dered moot because the state law was not sufficiently "related
to" airline "services," and the court ultimately reached the cor-
rect conclusion that state negligence law was not preempted;2 1
however, the Hodges construction may lead to perverse results
when applied to different facts and interpreted by different
courts. This construction expands the scope of preemption be-
yond what Congress intended. Furthermore, the "services" ver-
sus "operation or maintenance" analysis creates a distinction
without a difference in some cases and raises more difficulties
than it puts to rest.
Although confusion among courts is understandable due to
the vagueness of the term "services," the circumstances sur-
rounding the ADA suggest, at the very least, that basic tasks per-
formed by employees that are only remotely connected to the
price of a ticket-such as the tasks performed in Gill-should
not be considered "services." While courts must first look to the
language's plain meaning when interpreting a statute, the term
"services," without a statutory definition, is anything but clear.
Therefore, courts should look to the circumstances surrounding
the statute to determine legislative intent.2 9 Preemption provi-
sions are strictly and narrowly construed, and courts "look to
25 Id. (citing Hodges, 44 F.3d at 338-39 (holding that a tort claim was not pre-
empted under the ADA because the failure to maintain overhead bins to prevent
falling luggage was a matter of "operations" rather than "service")); see alsoJimi-
nez-Ruiz v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 344, 345, 348-49 (D.P.R. 2011)
(holding that personal injury claims for negligently failing to keep mobile disem-
barkation stairs dry and add safety features did not involve "services" and were
not preempted under the ADA); Dudley v. Bus. Express, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 199,
202-03, 207-08 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that claims for dangerous conditions in
an aircraft entryway and for failure to warn were not preempted by the ADA
because the claims concerned safety issues, not "services").
26 Gill, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41.
27 See id. at 43.





provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy."30
Moreover, it is always presumed that "Congress does not cava-
lierly pre-empt state-law causes of action," and Congress's pur-
pose is always the ultimate concern in preemption cases. 1
As the Ninth Circuit explained in Charas, Congress passed the
ADA to prevent states from imposing economic regulations on
the airline industry after the federal government removed its
own economic regulations. 32 The Supreme Court further de-
scribed Congress's goal as helping "assure transportation rates,
routes, and services that reflect maximum reliance on competi-
tive market forces, thereby stimulating efficiency, innovation,
and low prices, as well as variety and quality."3 3 In Rowe, the
Court stated that, although a state law may be preempted if its
impact on rates, routes, or services is indirect, the law must have
a "'significant impact"' related to Congress's objectives.34 Fur-
thermore, courts should examine the language of the statute in
context: in referring to airlines, "price" generally means the cost
of airfare between two locations, and "route" refers to the course
of travel between those locations. When included with these
two terms in the context of airline regulation, "service" likely
"refers to such things as the frequency and scheduling of trans-
portation, and to the selection of markets to or from which
transportation is provided (as in, 'This airline provides service
from Tucson to New York twice a day.')."36 The motivation be-
hind the ADA was certainly not to provide carriers with immu-
nity against ordinary tort claims. However, because the Hodges
interpretation encompasses most negligent actions performed
by an employee, it is easy to imagine a situation where an act
governed by tort law is considered a "service" and a court con-
cludes that tort law is preempted because of its impact on
airlines."
3o Id. (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986)).
31 Id. at 1265 (quoting Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
32 Id. (citing Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 230 (1994)).
3 Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 371 (2008) (quoting
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
34 Id. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390).
3 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1265.
36 Id. at 1265-66.
37 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
38 See id. at 236.
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Additionally, the distinction between "services" and "opera-
tion or maintenance" espoused by Hodges and followed by the
district court is completely unworkable, and the artificial nature
of this distinction casts doubt on whether it is really what Con-
gress intended." The requirement that airlines obtain insur-
ance for personal injuries from "operation or maintenance"
does indeed show Congress's intent to exempt at least some
state laws from being preempted by the ADA; clearly, there
would be no purpose for this requirement if a passenger could
never sue under state law to recover damages for personal in-
jury.40 Courts following the narrower interpretation of "service"
have concluded that this section conveys Congress's general in-
tent to exempt personal injury claims from preemption.4 1 The
district court, by contrast, followed the Hodges approach and
held the phrase "operation or maintenance" to mean that Con-
gress intended for the actual operation of the aircraft and main-
tenance to be exempt.4 2 The district court claimed, therefore,
that the term "service" includes "all bargained-for or anticipated
elements of air travel provided by air carriers except for those
related to aircraft operation and maintenance."4 3
If the issue were not already ambiguous enough, the "service"
versus "operations and maintenance" interpretation muddies
the water even further. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in
Charas, there are many situations where a non-material change
in the facts could determine whether a claim is preempted.4 4
For example, a passenger hit by the door on a beverage cart
could bring a personal injury claim if the door swung open due
to a broken latch, but that passenger could not bring a claim for
the same injury if the door swung open due to a flight attend-
ant's negligent failure to close the latch.4 5
This distinction becomes even more unworkable in certain
tort claims where it is hard to determine whether an incident is
the result of "service" or "maintenance." In Gill, it seems obvious
at first glance that the injury would fall under the category of
3 See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1263; Gill v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 836 F. Supp. 2d
33, 41 (D. Mass. 2011).
40 See Gill, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
41 Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir.
1998); Charas, 160 F.3d at 1264.
42 See Gill, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42.
4 See id.




"service" as defined by Hodges. Upon closer inspection, however,
the fact that the armrest was stuck in the "up" position seems to
be an issue relating to "maintenance." 6 Indeed, as Gill noted,
courts following the Hodges approach have interpreted "mainte-
nance" to include actions taken to ensure safety and prevent
hazardous conditions-not just on the plane itself, but also on
"boarding facilities" and ancillary equipment; such actions
would include, for example, ensuring that disembarkation stairs
are dry." Unfortunately, the district court failed to even discuss
whether the faulty armrest fell under the category of "mainte-
nance."48 Suggesting the faulty armrest was not a cause of the
accident would be a laughable conclusion; but for the malfunc-
tioning armrest, the employees would have been able to lower
the armrest and Gill would not have fallen. 4 9
This creates a difficult position for courts. When a court using
the Hodges interpretation encounters such a tort incident involv-
ing one cause relating to "service" and one cause relating to "op-
eration or maintenance," how should the court determine
whether the claim is preempted? Should the court decide in
which category the most significant cause falls and decide
whether the claim is preempted accordingly? This would create
more problems, requiring in some cases that the court perform
a detailed factual analysis simply to decide whether the plaintiff
can even bring a claim under the Hodges interpretation. Even
under this definition, it may be difficult to discern whether an
act is a "service," "operation," or "maintenance." The district
court pointed to Jiminez-Ruiz, in which a court found that per-
sonal injury claims alleging negligent failure to keep mobile dis-
embarkation stairs dry and add safety features did not involve
"services" and were not preempted under the ADA.o A failure
to keep stairs dry, however, could be analogized to the failure of
the JetBlue employees to lower the armrest; both involve tasks
ensuring passenger safety and employee negligence in failing to
perform those tasks."
46 See Gill, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 37, 40-41.
47 See id. (citing Hodges v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.
1995) (en banc); Jiminez-Ruiz v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 344, 345,
348-49 (D.P.R. 2011); Dudley v. Bus. Express, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 199, 207-08
(D.N.H. 1994)).
48 See id.
49 See id. at 37.
50 Id. (citing Jiminez-Ruiz, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 345, 348-49).
51 See id. at 37, 40-41; Jiminez-Ruiz, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 345, 348-49.
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The Hodges interpretation of the ADA creates an arbitrary and
artificial rule that is unpredictable and unworkable; in some sit-
uations, it may even contradict Congress's intent. Judge Jolly of
the Fifth Circuit noted the unpredictability and arbitrariness of
this test in Hodges by emphasizing that the majority and dissent
applied the same test but reached opposite conclusions. 2
Therefore, in Gill, the district court should have adopted the
narrow approach, which looks to "whether a common law tort
remedy frustrates deregulation by interfering with competition
through public utility-style regulation," because such a focus on
competitive market forces leads to a more accurate assessment
of congressional intent.53
52 Hodges, 44 F.3d at 342 (Jolly, J., concurring).
5 See Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir.
1998).
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